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Question 
What conditions make militia integration more likely to be effective and what are the common 
associated risks? What role has the international community played in militia integration? 
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The integration of militias into armed forces is often seen as a means of preventing the 
resumption of conflict in post-conflict settings (Colletta, 2012, p. 48). It has been used as a 
strategy in a number of countries, with recent examples including the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC) and South Sudan. 
Key risks associated with militia integration include: 
• Defection: Militias can use the threat of defection to obtain greater rewards or incentives 
from governments who want them to integrate into the armed forces. This can result in a 
cycle of defection and reintegration, with militia demands constantly increasing. 
• Dissatisfaction among the armed forces: Members of the armed forces may not be 
happy with militia members, who they previously fought against, obtaining positions of 
seniority, especially if these former militia members are promoted above long-serving 
officers. 
• Disconnect between militia integration and broader Security Sector Reform (SSR): 
Militia integration may not fit in with broader SSR aims, such as the downsizing or 
professionalisation of the armed forces. 
• Ethnic divisions: Militia integration can result in ethnic imbalances or rivalries within the 
armed forces. Moreover, former militia members may not shift allegiance to the central 
command, remaining loyal to, and taking orders from, those who were their leaders when 
they were militiamen. 
• Militia fragmentation: Militias rarely integrate in full, with some remnants opposing 
integration. These often go on to form new groups and new allegiances. 
Factors increasing the effectiveness of militia integration include: 
• Accountability: Some form of vetting procedure is important when integrating militias. 
Moreover, those responsible for abuses should be held accountable for their actions. 
• Rewards/ incentives: Militias are unlikely to agree to integration without rewards/ 
incentives for doing so. However, where possible these should be non-material, and 
should not result in further destabilisation. 
• Timeliness: This reduces the risk of militias defecting while waiting for the integration 
process to be finalised. 
There is a limited body of literature on militia integration into the armed forces. The literature 
consists largely of reports by research institutes, with some peer reviewed journal articles. Much 
of this literature is dated. The recent literature on militia integration focuses largely on DRC and 
South Sudan. There is very little recent evidence on the role of the international community in 
supporting militia integration. The literature identified during the course of the research was 
largely ‘gender-blind.’ 
2. Risks associated with militia integration 
Defection 
In South Sudan, leaders of armed groups took advantage of the fact that the government was 
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willing to make significant compromises in the militia integration process to achieve stability. 
They used force or the threat of violence as a bargaining chip, entering a cycle of defection and 
reintegration, to improve their own positions or personal wealth (Warner, 2016, p. 10). A similar 
situation occurred in DRC, where the government adopted a policy of ‘negotiation and co-
optation rather than pressure’ when dealing with armed groups. This had the same result as in 
South Sudan, with militias using threats of desertion or the rejection of army integration to obtain 
the ‘rewards’ they desired (Baaz & Verweijen, 2012, p. 14). They had an incentive to engage in 
violence, as by doing so they were viewed as a more significant threat by the government, which 
in turn was more willing to give them what they needed to integrate. The result in DRC was the 
emergence of parallel power structures within the armed forces. Moreover, it weakened the 
divisions between the army and extra-military networks, as these groups often maintained close 
connections with their local civilian constituencies or ‘non-integrated armed remnants’ (Baaz & 
Verweijen, 2012, p. 14).  
 
The perception that some militias receive more favourable concessions than others can also 
result in militias that have been integrated defecting. In DRC, there were several instances of 
militias opting for integration into the armed forces, only to defect and return to violence, as they 
believed other militias were being treated more favourably. In one case, a militia looted villages 
and raped dozens of women and children in response to hearing that they would receive ‘less 
favourable’ military ranks upon integration (Zena, 2013, p. 5). 
Ethnic divisions 
In South Sudan, the lack of ethnic or regional quotas for militia integration meant that the ethnic 
composition of the armed forces did not match the ethnic composition of the country. Although 
the Nuer ethnic group constitute about 16% of the country’s population, they made up 65-70% of 
the army (Warner, 2016, p. 11). The Dinka’s dominance in other government positions, due to 
the fact that they are traditional core constituency of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/ 
Army (SPLM/A), meant that smaller ethnic groups were underrepresented in powerful positions, 
leading to persisting grievances (Breitung et al, 2016, p. 14). Ethnic integration and mixing of 
units did occur, and there were attempts to relocate former militia leaders to other parts of the 
country. However, these were largely ineffective. Soldiers did not respect the central command, 
continuing instead to take orders from ‘their own’ leaders (Breitung et al, 2016, p. 14). 
 
Similarly, in DRC, militia members were generally unwilling to accept postings in regions where 
their ethnic group was not in control. Rivalries from the civil war persisted and led to tensions 
between different brigades within the armed forces. Moreover, some militia leaders who became 
senior ranking officers within the army due to their previous militia seniority went on to build a 
personal support base of soldiers within the army (Knight, 2009, p. 32). 
Dissatisfaction among the armed forces 
In South Sudan, members of the SPLA have not been happy about the militia integration 
process, as integrated officers are frequently offered a rank higher than that of other existing 
SPLA officers who had recently been engaged in fighting them. Some also regard the militia 
integration process as rewarding insurgency, and are concerned that SPLA officers unhappy with 
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their current rank could take up arms ‘as an alternative path to promotion’ (Small Arms Survey, 
2013, p. 10). 
Disconnect between militia integration and broader SSR  
In South Sudan, there was a disconnect between militia integration and broader security sector 
reform initiatives, which sought to downsize the armed forces and transform the SPLA into an 
‘accountable and affordable force’ (Breitung et al, 2016, p. 10). Militia integration had the 
opposite effect, resulting in an increase in the size of the armed forces and in the cost of 
maintaining them. This point is related to one made by Krebs and Licklider, who argue that 
sustaining large armed forces is generally beyond the fiscal capacity of post-conflict states, which 
already have many legitimate demands on their limited resources, including investment in future 
growth. They note that in cases where military spending is high this diverts funding from other 
important areas such as alleviating humanitarian suffering and long-term development (2014, p. 
136).  
Militia fragmentation 
All integration processes leave behind militia remnants. Militias are composed of members with 
different interests and motives, so there is often a lack of cohesion in decision-making. 
Therefore, when making decisions on integration or institutionalisation, militias often fragment to 
create new alliances and groups (Akl, 2017, p. 13). The degree to which this happens is 
influenced by a number of factors: 
• Ethnicity: The different ethnic groups within a militia, and the relationship between them, 
has an impact on how they fragment. 
• The background of members: There are differences in the way that militias composed 
of former soldiers or professional fighters and those composed of those with no military 
background fragment. 
• Religion: If militias have a religious identity, like Jihadist militias, then this will have an 
affect on how they fragment. 
• Political affiliations: There are differences in the ways in which militias motivated by 
political ideology and those motivated by narrower economic interests fragment. 
• Tribal affiliations: If militias consist of a majority of members from a specific tribe, then 
tribal interests will have an impact on how they fragment (Akl, 2017, p. 13). 
3. Factors increasing the effectiveness of militia 
integration 
According to Burgess (2008), the following factors are key in ensuring successful militia 
integration: 
• ‘The principles, values, and objectives of the military integration must be reflected in 
comprehensive peace settlements.  
• There must be a strategy and resources for the demobilisation of combatants.  
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• Major parties must have the political will to ensure that the rank-and-file comply with 
leadership directives.  
• All parties must be included in a flexible and adaptable process.  
• A realistic assessment of the capacity of the state and security forces to perform complex 
tasks associated with the process of military integration must be undertaken’ (p. 15). 
More detail about these and other factors that increase the effectiveness of militia integration is 
provided below. 
Accountability 
In order to ensure accountability, integration with systematic persecutions and vetting systems in 
place is the preferable. However, there is often resistance to such procedures among those to be 
integrated. Baaz and Verweijen advocate for the inclusion of a truth-telling dimension into 
integration procedures. They argue that this would ‘foster some sense of accountability’ and 
‘signal “new beginnings”’ among suspected perpetrators of abuses. They suggest that in 
combination with training and education, this could potentially contribute to a commitment to 
professional values, and strengthen combatants’ identification with their new institution (Baaz & 
Verweijen, 2012, p. 23). However, they acknowledge that such an approach cannot be used for 
perpetrators of grave abuses, who should at the very least be removed from command positions 
(Baaz & Verweijen, 2012, p. 23). 
Rewards/ incentives 
Militia members are unlikely to voluntarily accept integration. Thus it is important to determine 
which types of benefits they will be offered as an incentive to integrate. Such incentives often 
include professional categorisation, regular income, social benefits, government pardons and 
sometimes opportunities to participate in official politics (Akl, 2017, p. 12). Discussing the case of 
DRC, Baaz & Verweijen argue that it is important that pay-offs to integrated groups do not create 
further destabilisation. They suggest that providing non-material pay-offs, such as educational 
opportunities abroad, is one way of doing this. Moreover, they state that it is important to ensure 
that pay-offs do not become entrenched, as this would potentially give integrated groups a level 
of financial autonomy that would enable them to create a parallel network within the armed forces 
(2012, p. 24). 
Detailed integration agreements 
Militia integration agreements should have clear time-lines and clearly specify the rights and 
duties of the signatories in detail (Baaz & Verweijen, 2012, p. 24). Moreover, it is important that 
there are strict conditions for the handing over of arms and for ensuring that all fighters are either 
integrated or demobilized. For this to happen there needs to be control and verification in the 
areas formerly controlled by integrating armed groups, in order make sure that there are no arms 
caches or remaining combatants (Baaz & Verweijen, 2012, p. 24). Baaz and Verweijen suggest 
that external actors, like UN military observers, could play a role in verification (2012, pp. 24-25). 
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Timeliness 
Militia integration processes should be carried out in a timely manner. Failure to do this can result 
in re-defection, as happened with David Yau Yau’s militia in South Sudan in 2012. The group 
chose to resume rebellion as a result of the long waiting process for integration (Small Arms 
Survey, 2013, p. 10). 
 
4. Role of the international community in militia integration 
A literature review published by the University of Birmingham identifies two key lessons on the 
role of the international community in military integration generally: 
• International assistance can significantly increase the chances of successfully achieving 
integration. The most common forms of assistance are flexible ‘process’ support and 
technical military training.  
• International actors can play important arbitration roles if invited to do so by both parties 
to the integration process (Knight, 2009, p. 24).  
A peer-reviewed journal article on military integration, on the other hand, argues that integration 
is more effective if the international community does not play a central role in the process. It cites 
activities like providing side payments, offering reassurance and applying pressure as being 
indicative of a weak commitment to peace among the warring parties, and thus as a predictor of 
negative outcomes when the international community leaves (Krebs & Licklider, 2015, p. 104). 
The literature search undertaken for this report found little evidence of recent international 
support for militia integration processes. In the cases covered by this report, the international 
community appears to have played a very limited role in militia integration. The available 
information on international support for militia integration in South Sudan is contradictory. 
According to a policy brief published by Small Arms Survey, the international community 
reportedly actively supported negotiations with militia leaders in South Sudan (2013, p. 12). 
However, the nature of this support is unclear. On the other hand, an article in the Stability 
Journal states that no foreign assistance was requested or provided to support the integration 
process (Warner, 2016, p. 9). The article does however state that the UN provided limited 
support for some aspects of the military integration process, such as logistical assistance for 
some of the ceasefire negotiations with the late George Athor, leader of the South Sudan 
Defence Army, and during David Yau Yau’s first rebellion (2010-2011) (Warner, 2016, p. 9). The 
literature reviewed does not provide any information on the extent to which this support was 
effective. 
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